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HENRY

PAUL MONAGHAN

OVERBREADTH

I. INTRODUCTION
The concern in constitutional law with "overbreadth" is
generally understood to denote a conscious departure from conventional standing concepts in free-expression cases.' Assertedly
justified by the special vulnerability of protected expression to impermissible deterrence, 2 overbreadth doctrine invites litigants to
attack the facial validity of rules which burden expressive interests.
A litigant whose expression is admittedly within the constitutionally valid applications of a statute 3 is permitted to assert the staHenry Paul Monaghan is Professor of Law, Boston University.
I E.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979). Any use of standing concepts is troublesome at the outset. A
defendant in an enforcement proceeding or a prospective defendant who initiates a suit for
prospective relief has standing in the constitutional sense: These litigants are threatened with
injury in fact from application of the act. What is at stake in overbreadth challenges is the
scope of the issues open to these litigants, and, as will be shown, distinctions can be drawn
between actual defendants and prospective defendants initiating actions for anticipatory
relief.
Overbreadth challenges have also been entertained on behalf of litigants suffering injury in
fact but not readily viewed as either defendants or prospective defendants. Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (denial of a permit to use municipal
theater). See also Bogen, FirstAmendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REv. 679, 706-07
(1978) (overbreadth analysis used in area of statutes imposing civil disabilities, such as denials
of licenses and of public employment.)
2 Overbreadth challenges are typically said to rest on a "judicial prediction or assumption
that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612
(1973).
a While the discussion in this paper is generally applicable to administrative regulations
and orders as well as common law rules, I shall for convenience generally confine my
discussion to statutes.
@ 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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tute's potentially invalid applications with respect to other persons
not before the court 4 and with whom the litigant stands in no
special relationship. 5 Judicial focus is not on the protected character, vel non, of the litigant's expression 6 but on the terms of the
7
statutory rule being invoked to regulate that expression.
Overbreadth methodology has its charms. Avowedly speech
protective, it simultaneously fosters at least the illusion of comparative judicial restraint because it holds out the prospect that
other means may exist to achieve legislative objectives.8 But charm
is not its only attribute. Overbreadth's facial scrutiny approach has
been seen as "strong medicine," and both the Court and commentators have struggled with various limiting conceptions. The result
of these efforts is a body of doctrine widely perceived to be erratic
and confusing. It seems appropriate, therefore, to take stock. What
does overbreadth analysis entail? Specifically, how does its analytic
structure differ from that of the "conventional" constitutional challenge with which it supposedly stands in contrast? Examined from
this perspective, an increasingly wide gap appears between the
4 A "litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by
showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before
the court." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634

(1980).
5 Unlike ins tertii standing, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-97 (1976), no requirement exists of an identifiable third party with whom the overbreadth litigant stands in a
special relationship. See Note, Standing to Raise ConstitutionalJusTertii, 88 HARV. L. REV.
423, 438-44 (1974).
( "The claim that a statute is bad on its face because overbroad does not turn on evaluation
of factual data generated by a particular application." Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 863 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Harvard Note).
7 If "the statutory line includes conduct which the judicial line protects, the statute is
overbroad.... TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §12-24, p. 710 (1978). Thus a
statute regulating pornography must track or fall on the safe side of the applicable constitutional standards on obscenity. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
Of course, if the statute is held to be overbroad, the "statute" is not thereby erased from
the statute books. The judgment runs against named officials, who cannot enforce the statute
(at least not against the same litigants) unless it is rehabilitated along constitutionally acceptable lines. See note 134 infra.
8 By "holding out the prospect that narrower means may be available to achieve legislative
objectives, [overbreadth methodology] conveys the appearance of intervening in legislative
choices more marginally than outright 'balancing' would." GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 1188 (10th ed. 1980); SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 141-42
(1966); Professor Gunther has been critical of the Court's frequent refusal to articulate what
those alternatives are. Id. at 1187 n. 7; Gunther, Reflections on Robel ... , 20 STAN. L. REV.
1140, 1147-48 (1968). But see Harvard Note at 916-17 (court under no duty to discuss
alternatives).
9 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, note 2 supra, at 613.
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views of the commentators and holdings of the Court, a gap
obscured by the rhetoric accompanying the doctrine.
Judicial and academic fascination with overbreadth standing
tends to obscure an important point: Overbreadth is, in fact, a label
that has been utilized to cover not one but two doctrines.1 0 One is
concerned with the content of the substantive constitutional
standards for determining the validity of a statute affecting expression. This substantive dimension of overbreadth methodology is
most frequently concerned with matters of regulatory precision; the
means chosen by the legislature must be no broader than necessary
to achieve legitimate governmental purposes." The other, more
dramatic aspect of overbreadth analysis is the procedural
dimension-a supposed special First Amendment standing rule
permitting litigants to raise the rights of "third parties." In this
essay, I propose to show that, for the Court at least, overbreadth
doctrine does not in fact possess a distinctive standing component;
it is, rather, the application of conventional standing concepts in the
First Amendment context. Accordingly, overbreadth analysis is
simply an examination of the merits of the substantive constitutional claim.
Under "conventional" standing principles, a litigant has always
had the right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally
valid rule of law. Put differently, a litigant could make a facial
challenge to the constitutional sufficiency of the rule actually
applied to him, irrespective of the privileged character of his own
activity. To be sure, the litigant's challenge is to the statute in
operation, including the interpretive gloss placed on it; and in general the interpretive process can operate to narrow the statute to
appropriate constitutional dimensions. But however narrowed,
the boundary line of the rule actually invoked must either track or
fall on the safe side of the relevant rule of constitutional privilege,
10This dual aspect of the overbreadth label is recognized in ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 100-01, 229 n.1 (1980).
1' This test necessarily also involves, at least at the margins, some form of fact-dependent
balancing. Thus the governmental interest must be sufficiently substantial to support the
infringement on expression. E.g., ELY, note 10 supra, at 105-06; LOCKHART, KAMISAR, &
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 735-38 (5th ed. 1980).
For illustrative balancing decisions, see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20
(1967), despite its balancing disclaimer, and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
Compare Struve, The Less Restrictive AlternativePrincipleand Economic Due Process, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1463, 1480-88 (1967).
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that is, the judicially prescribed boundary line separating protected
12
from unprotected activity.
Viewed as a special "standing" concept, overbreadth theory is,
therefore, not unique in permitting facial challenges to rules.
Rather, for academic writers its distinctive aspect is the formulation
of constitutionally based limits on the traditional judicial power to
truncate statutes to constitutionally satisfactory boundaries in the
process of applying them. The theoretical and practical difficulties
with such a "standing" doctrine are considerable, and judicial doctrine has not evolved in this manner.
For the Court, its doctrinal difficulties notwithstanding, overbreadth is simply a disposition on the merits of the litigants' First
Amendment claim. The litigant's right to insist on the application
of a constitutionally valid rule translates into a requirement of congruence between the boundaries of the statute and the Constitution. This congruence requirement is of central importance not
only in the First Amendment context but wherever any standard of
review other than the rational basis test is mandated by the applicable substantive constitutional law. Overbreadth challenges are,
therefore, not confined to First Amendment adjudication. Nor does
an overbreadth litigant invoke the rights of third parties; as "a
theoretical matter the [overbreadth] claimant is asserting his own
right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law, though
naturally the claim is not one which depends on the privileged
character of his own conduct."' 3

II.

FACIAL CHALLENGES IN THE CONVENTIONAL CONTEXT: THE
LITIGANT'S RIGHT TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RULES

"Conventional" constitutional challenges are widely assumed to involve distinctive characteristics. Generally, a litigant
may raise only his "own" rights, not those of others; thus he can
challenge a statute only "as applied" to him.' 4 Formulations of this
character can suggest that a conventional constitutional challenge
can be completely reduced to a claim of substantive constitutional
12

BATOR,

MISHKIN, SHAPIRO, & WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 212 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER).
13 Harvard Note at 848.
14 United

States v. Raines, note 1 supra.
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privilege; that is, the litigant must demonstrate that the conduct
established by the evidence is, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, simply immune from regulation. Professor Gunther, for
example, says that in as-applied review, "the Court asks simply
whether the challenger's activities are protected."' 5 A litigant, of
course, can always make such a challenge, and that contention can
be framed either in privilege terms, or alternatively, as a challenge
to the statute "as applied."' 6 However phrased, the challenge is
wholly fact dependent: Do the determinative facts shown by the
evidence fall on the protected side of the applicable rule of constitutional privilege? '7
In their efforts to identify the distinctive standing aspects of
overbreadth methodology, many commentators assume that conventional constitutional challenges are invariably restricted to such
fact-dependent claims of privilege.'" This conclusion seems to be
entailed by the fact that courts can narrow the literal sweep of
statutes to fit governing constitutional standards. In other words, in
the process of applying a statute, courts can narrow the legislative
prescription to a set of criteria which (a) are constitutionally permissible and (b) fit the general facts of the litigant's conduct as established by the evidence. 19
Inherent in the narrowing process is a judicial conclusion that the
challenged statute is "separable"; that is, the legislature intended
the statute to be applied whenever it validly could be, with any
invalid applications excised in the application process.2 ° Volumes
of judicial decisions attest to the fact that courts are thoroughly
Is GUNTHER, note 8 supra, at 1187.
16 "Whenever the application point has merit, the party who asserts it could forego the
challenge to the statute [as applied], asserting his federal right or immunity on the determinative facts,..." HART & WECIISLER at 591.
17 In this context, the only consequence of casting the constitutional contention in asapplied rather than privilege terms relates to the technical difference between seeking Supreme Court review by way of appeal rather than certiorari. Casting the point as a challenge
to the statute as applied makes an appeal available under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. E.g., McCarty v.
McCarty, 101 S. Ct., 2728, 2734 n.12 (1981). The distinction between those two modes of
review has become increasingly blurred. HART & WECI ISI.ER'S 1981 Supplement at 160-63;
see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
" E.g., Shaman, The First Amendment Rule against Overbreadtb, 52 TFI.\t1,I.E L. Q. 259, 261
(1979).
"SE.g., United States v. Raines, note I supra, at 21-22.
211In this context, the policy of implementing presumed legislative intent is, of course,
strongly reinforced by the policy counseling avoidance of constitutional questions. United
States v. Raines, note I supra.
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familiar with the separability technique; 21 indeed, the normal judicial course is to approach the issue of constitutional validity with a
presumption of separability. That presumption inclines the reviewing court toward reducing the broad legislative command to a
permissible subrule general enough to cover the facts of the case
before it.2 2 Vagueness challenges are no exception to this process;
ordinarily the Court2 3 considers such a challenge in terms of the
statute as construed.
Moreover, in reviewing state court decisions, the Supreme Court
will presume that the state statute is separable unless the contrary
otherwise clearly appears. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co.2 4 is the paradigm. There a railroad company challenged
the constitutionality of an award of actual damages and a $25.00
penalty for a partial loss of a shipment of vinegar. The state court
had made the award under a statute that "required [the railroad] to
settle all claims for lost or damaged freight within a specified time
period. The state court made no effort to explicate the reach of the
statute; the court simply held that it embraced (and constitutionally
could embrace) defendant's refusal to settle. In the Supreme
Court, the railroad argued that, as written, the statute also re21 Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76
(1937). See also, for example, United States v. Raines, note 1 supra.
22 The narrowing process is, of course, circumscribed by fair-warning requirements. See
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 (1965) (limiting construction "may be applied
to conduct occurring prior to the construction. ... provided such application affords fair
warning . .. "). Narrowing of criminal statutes at the appellate stage may come too late.
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966). Finally, the narrowing process may itself on
occasion render the statute impermissibly vague. See, for example, Smith v. Cahoon, 283
U.S. 553, 563-65 (1931); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). Compare the cases
cited in note 23 infra.
23 "For the purposes of determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite to
constitute valid legislation 'Ave must take the state statute as though it read precisely as the
highest court of the state has interpreted it.' " Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23
(1973), quoting Minnesota ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 273 (1940). "....
[A]lthough it is usual to conceive of the void-for-vagueness cases as cases in which the
Supreme Court passes upon the 'face' validity of statutes, in fact what the Court is far more
frequently reviewing is a state court's reading of the statute.' " Amsterdam, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine in theSupreme Court, 109 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 67, 68 (1960). See also
United States v. National Dairy Product Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 31-33 (1963), and United
States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-94 (1975), rejecting vagueness attacks to federal statutes
"as applied." Cf. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971), where the Court sustained a
vagueness attack as applied, while a concurring opinion, id. at 546, "would go further and
hold that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face." See generally Brache v. Co.
of Westchester, 658 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1981).
24 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
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quired settlement of frivolous claims and thus violated the due25
process clause. The Court rejected the contention in these terms:
As applied to [this] case, we think the statute is not repugnant
to [the Fourteenth Amendment] ....
Although seemingly conceding this much, counsel for the
railway company urges that the statute is not confined to cases
like the present, but equally penalizes the failure to accede to an
excessive or extravagant claim; in other words, that it contemplates the assessment of the penalty in every case where the
claim presented is not settled within the time allotted, regardless
of whether, or how much, the recovery falls short of the amount
claimed. But it is not open to the railway company to complain
on that score. It has not been penalized for failing to accede to an
excessive or extravagant claim, but for failing to make reasonably
prompt settlement of a claim which upon due inquiry has been
pronounced just in every respect. Of course, the argument to
sustain the contention is that, if the statute embraces cases such
as are supposed, it is void as to them, and, if so void, is void in
toto. But this court must deal with the case in hand, and not with
imaginary ones. It suffices, therefore, to hold that, as applied to
cases like the present, the statute is valid. How the state court
may apply it to other cases, whether its general words may be
treated as more or less restrained, and how far parts of it may be
sustained if others fail, are matters upon which we need not
speculate now [citations omitted]....
Yazoo, it should be noted, came to the Supreme Court without
any authoritative construction of the statute by the state courts. In
these circumstances, the Supreme Court will presume that the state
statute is separable; that is, that the state court has fixed the statute's
boundary at or within a clearly ascertainable line separating legitimate from illegitimate exercises of state power. 2 6 This means that,
in subsequent cases, the state court is expected to excise any invalid
applications. Just last term, for example, the Court applied the
separability presumption to reject an overbreadth challenge to a
statute requiring parental notification of a minor's decision to have
25

Id. at 219-20, See also Smily v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1905).

26 Indeed, the state court's decision is unintelligible on any other premise. If, for example,

in the Yazoo context the state court subsequently holds the statute inseparable, the initial
application of the statute to the railroad in Yazoo cannot be justified. See Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, note 17 supra, at 2899 n.26. Perhaps, however, in a civil context notions of
finality and reliance by the plaintiff might operate so as to bar restitutionary recovery by the
railroad; such notions support a holding that the decision with respect to inseparability is to
have prospective application only.
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an abortion. In H. L. v. Matheson,2

the minor argued that the

statutory requirement was impermissibly "overbroad"

28

insofar as

it required a notification for "mature and emancipated" minors.
Despite a broad class certification by the trial court, the state supreme court, consistent with the pleadings and the evidence, considered the statute only insofar as it reached unemancipated minors
living with their parents, and it upheld the statute. The Supreme
Court affirmed, stating that: "We cannot assume that the statute,
when challenged in a proper case, will not be construed also to
exempt demonstrably mature minors."

29

Quite plainly, the more a statute is cut down to state a permissible subrule general enough to cover the facts of the litigant's case,
the more the substance of the litigant's claim becomes that of a
fact-dependent claim of constitutional privilege. But this is not invariably so. A fundamental principle of our system of constitutional
law lies behind the proclivity of courts to narrow the sweeping
reach of statutory language. The operative rule, either as enacted or
construed, must conform to the Constitution. Thus, in addition to
a claim of privilege, a litigant has always been permitted to make
another, equally "conventional" challenge: He can insist that his
conduct be judged in accordance with a rule that is constitutionally
valid.3 0 In sharp contrast to a fact-dependent privilege claim, a
challenge to the content of the rule applied is independent of the
specific facts of the litigant's predicament. Rather, it speaks to the
relationship between the facial content of the rule being applied to
the facts and the applicable constitutional law, and it insists that the
rule itself be valid.
Considerable decisional law demonstrates that a sanction imposed under a facially invalid rule cannot be saved by factdependent references to the nonprivileged character of the litigant's
27 101 S.Ct. 1164 (1981).
28

Id.at 1169.

29Ibid.

30A "defendant in a coercive proceeding... always has standing to challenge the validity
of the statute in the terms in which it is applied to him." HART & IVECHSLER'S 1981
Supplement at 88. But the position of a prospective defendant bringing an action for declaratory relief need not be assimilated to that of an actual defendant. To be sure, any litigant is
entitled to be free from the application of an unconstitutional rule of law if the court reaches
the merits of the case and its judgment has preclusive effect. See Federated Department
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981); Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory
Judgments, 74 Nw. L. REv. 759 (1979). But that right does not mean that he can insist on the
scope of the rule being adjudicated in advance of its actual application. See text at pp. 33-36.
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conduct. (To be sure, many of the cases involve judicial efforts to
avoid deciding the ultimate question of whether the litigant's conduct is constitutionally privileged. But fact-independent evaluation
of the rule employed is available to the litigant even if it be
assumed, ex ante, that no constitutionally privileged conduct is involved.) Vagueness cases illustrate the point. A litigant can challenge the terms of the rule applied without showing that his own
conduct is privileged against conviction under a statute giving better notice of what constitutes the offense.31 Similarly, one could
because the connot be denied equal protection of the laws simply
32
privileged.
duct at issue is not independently
The same principle is applicable with respect to right-based
claims. The validity of the rule invoked is at issue, wholly apart
from the character of the litigant's conduct. Suppose, for example,
that dancing by oneself in a barroom is constitutionally privileged
activity, unless the dancer has bare feet. Even if the evidence
showed that the defendant was dancing in his bare feet, a conviction could not be sustained under a statute which, as construed,
makes criminal only the act of barroom dancingper se. 3 3 A litigant
has always had the right to be free from being burdened by an
unconstitutional rule, whatever the state of the evidence. 34 This is
31 See the cases cited in note 23supra. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), is a
particularly apt illustration of the point that facial attacks are not dependent on the quality of
defendant's conduct. The Court there reversed a "sit-in" conviction of black defendants for
violating a state's trespass statute prohibiting "entry" without the owner's consent. In so
doing, the Court did not rule that defendant's conduct was constitutionally privileged; it
simply held that the rule actually applied was rendered impermissibly vague when statutory prohibition of unconsented "entry" was judicially enlarged to include remaining
after consent has been withdrawn. Id. at 352-55.
32 Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981) (by
implication). Few cases of selective enforcement of criminal statutes are accompanied by a
meaningful independent claim of constitutional privilege. See generally Note, The Right to
NondiscriminatoryEnforcement of State Penal Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961); Givelber,
The Application of Equal ProtectionPrinciplesto Selective Enforcement of the CriminalLaw, 1973 U.
Ill. L. F. 88.
33 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), discussed in HART &
Thompson ... does not say that Kentucky could not prohibit a person
WECHSLER at 615: "1...

from dancing alone publicly in a cafe." As will be apparent from the discussion that
follows, the state court's decision that the statute makes criminal only the act of dancing may,
in effect, be a holding that the statute is inseparable; as a matter of state law, it cannot be
truncated to constitutionally accepted limits. If the state court is clear about that, no room for
the Yazoo presumption exists.
34 E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397
U.S. 564, 569-71 (1970). See also New York R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 528-30 (1906); United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1905); Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 152 U.S.
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made particularly clear by the "inseparability" cases. Many statutes
are susceptible to both valid and invalid applications. Sometimes,
as a matter of construction, the statute is held to be "inseparable"-that is, a nullity unless good in all its reasonable and foreseeable applications. This occurs, most typically, where the court
concludes that, given the nature or range of the act's invalid applications, the legislature would not want the statute to stand, or
that the court simply cannot sever the valid from the invalid applications. In United States v. Reese, 35 for example, the Supreme Court
sustained a demurrer to an indictment against a state official for a
racially discriminatory refusal to receive and count a vote in a state
election contrary to a Congressional enactment. While application
of the act to the defendant was clearly valid given the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition of such state action, the Court stressed
that, facially, the act also prohibited racially motivated private interference with voting in state elections. The Court said: "We are
not able to reject a part [of the statute] which is unconstitutional,
and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that
which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is
3 6

not."

Salient examples of direct challenges to the constitutional adequacy of rules impinging on rights without regard to the quality of
defendant's conduct appeared in First Amendment adjudication
long before the flowering of overbreadth doctrine in the 1960s.
These decisions, it should be noted, cannot fairly be viewed as
160, 169-70 (1894); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1879). See also Ulster County
Court v. Allen, note I supra, at 160 (. . . the Court has held it irrelevant in analyzing a
mandatory presumption, . . . that there is ample evidence in the record other than the
presumption to support a conviction"). See generally Note, Supreme CourtJudgment of State
Statute as Unconstitutionalon Its Face, 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 684 (1956).
3592 U.S. 214 (1876).
" Id. at 221. See also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1880) (defendants were
indicted for counterfeiting trademarks which, apparently, were actually used in interstate or
foreign commerce; nonetheless, the Court upheld the defense that the statute was beyond
Congressional power, because the act was not so limited and its language could not be
narrowed by construction). In the Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 500-02 (1908),
the Court invalidated an employers' liability act in an action by employees engaged in
interstate commerce at time of injury. The Court said that, in terms, the act applied
whenever the employer was engaged in interstate commerce regardless of the nature of the
employee's activity.
See also the extensive collection of cases in Stern, note 21 supra. See also Note, 47 H ARV.
L. REv. 677, 680-81 (1934). The cases cited in note 34supraare all ultimately premised on a
holding that the statutes involved were inseparable. See, e.g., Metromedia, note 17 supra, at
2890 n.26.
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unacknowledged applications of a special First Amendment standing doctrine. Quite to the contrary; the Court simply applied conventional doctrine to permit the litigant to challenge the content of
the rule applied to him. In Terminiello v. Chicago,37 for example, the
Court reversed a disorderly conduct conviction based on a violently
racist, anti-Semitic speech, even though the protected character of
the speech itself was at least doubtful under the then existing constitutional doctrine. 3 8 Over objection that only the privilege issue
was properly before it, 39 the Court focused entirely on the terms of
the rule actually applied. 40 And the Court held that the state court's
statutory construction, which permitted conviction for speech
which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, [or] brings about a
condition of unrest.
,",41 rendered the rule constitutionally impermissible.
An even more graphic illustration is the fountainhead of the
overbreadth doctrine itself, Tbornbill v. Alabama. 4 2 Tbornhill involved review of a state conviction for labor picketing. The statute
prohibited anyone "without a just cause" to "go near to or loiter
about" any business for the purpose of "hindering, delaying, or
interfering with or injuring" the business. The state courts made no
effort to narrow the sweep of the statute and sustained a conviction
based on a charge framed substantially in terms of the statutory
language. The Supreme Court reversed. After first concluding that
peaceful picketing generally constituted "speech" within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantee, the Court turned its attention to the
constitutional sufficiency of the rule applied, rather than to a factoriented review to determine whether the circumstances of the particular picketing involved rendered it unprotected. 4 3 The Court
advanced two justifications in defense of this approach, the second
of which gave birth to the overbreadth doctrine.4 4 Prior to its over373 3 7 U.S. 1 (1949).
31Compare Beuharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
"aNote 37 supra, at 8-12 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 Id.at 5-6.
41 Id.at 3.
42 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
43 Id. at 106 n.23. ("The fact that the activities for which petitioner was arrested and
convicted took place on the private property of the Preserving Company is without
significance .. ")
44Id. at 97-98. See infra at 44-45.
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breadth discussion, however, the Court made plain that conventional analysis included a perusal of the facial validity of the rule
45
applied:
The finding against petitioner was a general one. It did not
specify the testimony upon which it rested. The charges were
framed in the words of the statute and so must be given a like
construction. The courts below expressed no intention of narrowing the construction put upon the statute by prior State
decisions. In these circumstance[s], there is no occasion to go
behind the face of the statute or of the complaint for the purpose
of determining whether the evidence, together with the permissible inferences to be drawn from it, could ever support a conviction founded upon different and more precise charges ...
The State urges that petitioner may not complain of the deprivation of any rights but his own. It would not follow that on this
record petitioner could not complain of the sweeping regulations
here challenged.
The foregoing cases make plain that a litigant has long possessed the
right to question the validity of the rule actually applied and to
insist that it"is invalid upon its face." 4 6 This is but a corollary of
the proposition that the "constitutional validity of the law is to be
tested not by what has been done under it, but what may, by its
authority, be done."' 4 7 The doctrine is a general one, in no way
limited to either First Amendment or criminal cases. In Wuchter v.
Pizzutti,4 8 for instance, the Court permitted a nonresident motorist
to challenge a statutory scheme governing service of process on
nonresidents. The statute imposed no requirement of notice, and
the state court imposed none by way of construction. Even though
the defendant had in fact received notice, the Court found a constitutional violation in these circumstances. "[Notice not] having
constitubeen directed by the statute it can not, therefore, supply
49
tional validity to the statute or to service under it."
45

Id. at 96. See also Bachellar v. Maryland, note 34 supra, at 569-71.

46 Smith v. Cahoon, note 22 supra, at 562.
47 Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., note 34 supra, at 169-70,
quoting Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 188 (1878).
48 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

'9 Id. at 24. The decision is vulnerable to criticism for ignoring the "Yazoo presumption."
Compare National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-18 (1964).
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Many of the foregoing cases may be conceptualized as testing a
rule in terms of its impact on "third parties." 50 Be that as it may,
the underlying reality remains: Faced with a challenge to the validity of the rule ultimately extracted from a statute, a court tests that
rule, consciously or not, by imagining relatively standard instances
of its application. On that basis it determines whether the content
of the rule is valid. 51 Moreover, these decisions illustrate that overbreadth doctrine cannot be viewed as uniquely concerned with the facial
content of the rule applied to the litigant.52 Rather, as the next section
shows, the core of overbreadth standing theory is elsewhere: It
inheres in an assertion of constitutionally imposed limits on the
power of courts to narrow statutes in the process of applying them.
I will argue that, academic theorists notwithstanding, courts have
refused to impose such limits; instead, they have applied conventional separability doctrine to narrow statutes in the face of overbreadth attacks. Viewed most comprehensively, therefore, overbreadth methodology is now best understood not as a special
standing doctrine but as simply an expression of the underlying
substantive constitutional law. Given the content of that law, how0 The Court apparently now treats these cases as "exceptions" to the various formulation
of the rule that a litigant can assert only his "own" rights:
And the rules' rationale may disappear where the statute in question has already
been declared unconstitutional in the vast majority of its intended applications,
and it can fairly be said that it was not intended to stand as valid, on the basis of
fortuitous circumstances, only in a fraction of the cases. See Butts v. Merchants
& M. Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126. The same situation is presented when a state
statute comes conclusively pronounced by a state court as having an otherwise
valid provision or application inextricably tied up with an invalid one, see Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290; or possibly in that rarest of cases where this
Court can justifiably think itself able confidently to discern that Congress would
not have desired its legislation to stand at all unless it could validly stand in its
every application.
United States v. Raines, note Isupra, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
51These hypothetical applications may, of course, be grounded in past examples of enforcement of the statute or in agency interpretations of the statute's reach.
52 1 express no opinion on whether facial scrutiny of the rule applied is constitutionally
requircd-whether, for example, the Congress could restrict the Court to considering
whether the conduct shown by the evidence is constitutionally privileged. I once indicated
such a view. See Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 43
(1975), but I now doubt the soundness of that position. The Supreme Court has intimated
that at least in the criminal context a challenge to the content of the rule cannot be foreclosed.
E.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) ("Conviction upon a charge not made
would be sheer denial of due process.") See also, for example, Bachellar v. Maryland, note 34
supra. It is hard to see any relevant differences between civil and criminal proceedings in this
respect. Wuchter v. Pizutti, note 48 supra, and accompanying text.
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ever, the conventional standing principle that a litigant can always
insist on application of a vflid rule takes on considerable importance.
III. OVERBREADTH AS A FEDERALLY MANDATED
INSEPARABILITY RULE

Consideration of overbreadth doctrine in the First Amendment context is best prefaced by a brief, albeit oversimplified, account of the operative substantive law. First Amendment law treats
content-based regulations as presumptively invalid. 53 Indeed, not
long ago content-based governmental regulation appeared to be
automatically invalid unless confined to one of a few narrowly
defined categories of unprotected speech: incitement, fighting
words, obscenity, defamation, etc. 54 Recent decisions increasingly
indicate, however, that these categories may state only the
minimum, not the maximum, extent of governmental regulatory
power; speech not falling within an unprotected category may be
regulated if the compelling state interest or some other balancing
test is satisfied. 55 And, in any event, some form of balancing must
be employed to assess the validity of non-content-based restric56
tions on expression.
Thornhill v. Alabama 57 must be evaluated against this general
background. In Thornhill, the Court suggested that, in free-speech
cases, courts are shorn of their general power to narrow statutes in
53By "content-based" rules, I mean, following Ely, rules that regulate speech because the
evils sought to be controlled flow from the communicative content of the speech. See Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancingin First Amendment
Analysi, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1497-98 (1975). See generally TRIBE, note 7supra, § 12-2.
54 ,,...
only expression fairly assignable to one of an increasingly limited set of narrowly
defined categories could be denied constitutional protection." Ely, note 53, supra, at 1491.
See also ELY, note lOsupra, at 109-16.
55E.g., Haig v. Agee, 101 S.Ct. 2766 (1981); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726
(1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25, 66
(1976); Procunier v. Martinez, note 11 supra, at 410-14. See also Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, note 17 supra.
a"E.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559
(1981); United States Postal Service v. Council Greenburg Civic Ass'n. 101 S. Ct. 2676, 2686
(1981) ("This Court has long recognized the validity of reasonable time, place and manner
regulations on such a [public] forum so long as the regulation is content neutral, serves a
significant governmental interest, and leaves open adequate alternative channels for communication"). ELY, note 10 supra, at 110-16.
'7 Note 42 supra, at 88.
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the application process. In launching the overbreadth doctrine, the
58
Court said,
There is a further reason for testing the [statute] on its face....
Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned
there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the
statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which
prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against
transgression.
Thornhill seems to posit an extraordinary, constitutionally based
limitation on the traditional judicial power to truncate statutes to
constitutionally acceptable limits. It seems, in other words to create
a federally mandated rule with respect to the inseparability of statutes affecting expression and thereby forces consideration of the
'5 9
statutory rule "as written.
Any federally imposed limitation on the power of the state courts
to narrow state statutes in the application process generates evident
difficulties. 60 Constraints on separability judgments undermine the
role of the state courts as expositors and shapers of state law, and
thus they cut against the general grain of "Our Federalism." This
objection, however, must be evaluated in light of the broader ways
in which federal constitutional prohibitions confine the authority of
all state institutions, including the state courts. And it is particularly clear that the constitutional guarantee of free speech generates
procedural and remedial limitations on the ways in which the states
structure their decision-making processes. 6 1 Thus, a doctrine that
the Constitution imposes limits on the authority of the state courts
in the construction of state statutes cannot be rejected a priori.
Indeed, much ius tertii standing may, on analysis, prove to be such
a doctrine; it limits, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the
power of state courts to sever statutes if certain relationships exist
between the litigant and identifiable third parties. 62 In an over58Id. at 97-98.
59 See Comment, Inseparabilityin Application of Statutes ImpairingCivil Liberties, 61 HARv.
L. REV. 1208, 1211 (1948). The assertion, Harvard Note at 894, that the inseparability point
is "question begging" is both unexplained and mystifying.
60 Apart, that is, from satisfaction of the traditional requirement of fair warning. See note
22 supra.
61 Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970).
62 This seems true at least in those cases where the statute imposes duties directly upon the
third party claimant. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); HART &
WECHSLER'S 1981 Supplement at 82-83. See also note 5 supra. Perhaps some ins tertii cases

16

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

breadth challenge, no identifiable third party and no special relationship exist. Still, it can be and has been argued that some limits
on the power of state courts to truncate state statutes impinging on
expression are desirable. This conception might be thought to follow from the deterrence rationale supposedly underlying the overbreadth doctrine-the statute's "very existence" may deter
others. 6" Accordingly, the most sensible and refined approach is
one which properly accommodates the traditional interpretive autonomy of state courts with the values promoted by the First
Amendment.
Despite significant differences among overbreadth theorists, the
crucial feature of overbreadth analysis can be viewed as centered on
this problem of accommodation; that is, the core task becomes the
identification, ex ante, of those situations in which, as a matter of
constitutional law, truncating is not permitted. The commentator's
efforts display considerable variety. Some writers interpret Thornbill as a "clear holding" that a statute regulating speech which
"embraces permissible as well as impermissible applications is void
on its face and inseparable .... , 64 Stated in this form, overbreadth
doctrine is completely hostile to any notion of accommodation, and
it constitutes a strong antiseparability doctrine. Judicial attention
is, quite literally, directed to the face of the statute; having been
found to include prohibited applications, the statute becomes, in
effect, a dead letter, incapable of even prospective resuscitation by
narrowing construction. This view of the overbreadth doctrine
gives us everything but the why. No convincing explanation is
proffered as to why a state statute, if acceptably narrowed, cannot
be applied thereafter within its new confines. It would appear, after
all, that the deterrence rationale underlying the overbreadth doccan be reconceptualized as resting on a premise that the constitutional right of the third-party
right holder implies a corollary constitutional right in the litigant.
63 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, note 2 supra, at 612 ["... the possibility that protected
speech or assertive activity may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute"].
Village of Schaumburg, note 4supra, at 634 ["... persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a
statute susceptible of application to protected expression"]. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
521 (1972). See generally Harvard Note. For recent challenges to the deterrence rationale,
see note 150 infra.
64 Wormuth and Mirkin, The Doctrine of the ReasonableAlternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254,
274 (1964). See also Shaman, note 18 supra, at 260-61, 277-80 (judicial narrowing
inconsistent with premises of overbreadth doctrine). See also Note, Inseparabilityin Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1208 (1948) (state courts cannot
narrow statute).
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trine is fully spent once a substantively acceptable narrowing construction has been provided.
Other, less sweeping but more sophisticated, versions of overbreadth have surfaced. These accounts do not deny a general authority in the state court to narrow statutes in the application process even where First Amendment interests are implicated. Rather,
they seek to specify the circumstances in which that course is improper. Two general lines have emerged.
1. The mildest form of overbreadth doctrine insists that the narrowing is improper when the surviving remnants of the rule is itself
unconstitutional. That form of the doctrine is saved from utter
triviality only by its emphasis on the special vagueness concerns in
the First Amendment area. 65 Professor Tribe rightly argues that all
too frequently judicial narrowing "simply exchanges overbreadth
for vagueness." ' 66 Tribe offers as an example a hypothetical statute
which on its face makes criminal all public speech but which has
been "construed" so as not to reach constitutionally protected activity. 67 The illustration reinforces his point, but it is of little analytic aid; such wholly indeterminate statutes are seldom enacted
and reach the Court yet more infrequently. 6 8 In any event, this
formulation of overbreadth doctrine draws upon no uniquely
speech-based constitutional principle. It has been long clear in
"conventional" constitutional challenges that an attempted saving
construction may patch one constitutional difficulty while simultaneously resulting in the different but equally impermissible vice
of indefiniteness. 69 Thus, the overbreadth-vagueness axis simply

"'

See, e.g., Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566(1974); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S.
610 (1976). See generally Harvard Note at 871-75. Professor Freund long ago emphasized
this aspect of overbreadth analysis. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 67-68 (1961).
66TRIBE, note 7supra, at § 12-26, p. 716.
67

Ibid.

61Thornhill v. Alabama, note 42 supra and accompanying text, could have reached the
Court in that posture if the state court had held that its antipicketing statute applied to bar all
picketing "except where the federal constitution required otherwise."
19 "The decision thus aims to remove the constitutional objection of invalid application
only by creating another constitutional objection of lack of appropriate certainty. Had the
legislature written into the statute itself that it was binding.. .' only so far as the provisions
are legally applicable,' it would have transcended the permissible limits of statutory
indefiniteness." Smith v. Cahoon, note 22 supra, at 565. It should be noted that state statutes
made operative "to the extent constitutionally permissible" are not uncommon in the fields of
state taxation and "long arm" services of process. Vagueness is of greater concern with
respect to such statutes when criminal liability is at issue. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), with Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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becomes expressive of the demands of the relevant substantive constitutional law, not a distinctive aspect of either free-speech or
standing doctrine.
Moreover, this vagueness facet of overbreadth methodology
seems to be waning. Recent Supreme Court cases illustrate a diminishing judicial enthusiasm for vagueness analysis in the First
Amendment context. Arnett v. Kennedy70 is the paradigm. Acting
under statutory authority to dismiss employees for "such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service," the federal government
discharged a civil service employee for speech critical of his
superior. The Court rejected, inter alia, his overbreadth claim,
stating, "We hold the [such cause . . .]language . . .excludes
constitionally protected speech and that the statute is therefore not
overbroad.''7 1 Perhaps the Arnett approach should be confined to
statutes that in terms of ordinary applications are not focused on
speech content; "just cause" discharges will, in the normal run, turn
on the nonexpressive rather than the expressive features of the
employee's conduct. But the Court evinces no disposition to so
confine its holding, 2 and while vagueness challenges are, of course,
still sustained in the First Amendment context, the Court seems far
less inclined than formerly to find such a transgression.
2. A more intriguing form of overbreadth methodology would
bar judicial narrowing of statutes even if the statute, as narrowed,
would not thereby be rendered unconstitutionally vague. Narrowing would be prohibited in settings which lack a clear, bright line
separating unprotected from protected expression. 73 Stated
affirmatively, saving constructions would be permitted only in
those contexts in which a "determinative rule of privilege" 74 exists
to constrain the statute.
70

416 U.S. 134 (1974).

Id. at 162. The plurality opinion was joined on this point by other justices. Id. at 164
(Powell and Blackmun, J.J.); id. at 177 (White, J.).
72 See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114-15 (1974), sustaining against a
vagueness attack the federal obscenity statute as judicially restricted to accord with the
requirements of Miller v. California, note 7 supra; Buckley v. Valeo, note 55 supra, at
44, 76-80, narrowing construction given to parts of the Federal Election Campaign Act;
United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
569-80 (1973), sustaining Hatch Act on the basis of prior administrative interpretations.
73 TRIBE, note 7 supra, at § 12-26, pp. 714-16. The foundation for this approach is the
71

much admired but, on close inspection, vague and abstract analysis of overbreadth doctrine
in Harvard Note, note 6supra, at 883-90.
74 Harvard Note at 883.

OVERBREADTH

19

A rule of privilege, it will be recalled, is simply the relevant line
separating constitutionally protected from constitutionally unprotected activity. Whenever the categorization approach states the
relevant substantive First Amendment law, the unprotected categories ("incitement, obscenity, fighting words, etc.") constitute the
relevant privilege rules. In Section II, I have argued that, under
conventional principles, a litigant could always insist on the application of a valid rule, and accordingly, statutes, to be valid, must
track, either expressly or by construction, the relevant rule of
privilege. Overbreadth theory would, of course, be entirely empty
of distinctive content if it simply required conformity of the statute
to the relevant First Amendment privilege rule. Sophisticated
overbreadth theory is not empty. Emphasizing "determinative,"
advocates of this form of overbreadth methodology do not equate
"determinative rules of privilege" with the judicially established
categories delineating unprotected speech. Rather, effort is made to
distinguish among the various unprotected categories.
The unprotected categories are, ex hypothesi, not unconstitutionally vague. Nevertheless, overbreadth theorists maintain that some
of these categories involve a constellation of fact-dependent variables too numerous in range and too unpredictable in application to
be regarded as sufficiently determinative for the purpose of slicing a
statute to acceptable constitutional limits. 75 Professor Tribe, for
example, rejects the "fighting words" exception as a satisfactory
constraining limitation; it is, he says, not "precise and focused
enough to give advance warning of the exact reach of the statute
punishing offensive speech, since decisions under the standard turn
on the facts particular to the speaker, the audience, and their interaction." '7 6 The result is curious: A statute prohibiting "fighting
words" in the terms defined by the Supreme Court could be validly
applied to any litigant, while a statute prohibiting some form of
"offensive speech" but readily constrained by a court to reach identically defined "fighting words" could not be so applied, even prospectively.
Attempts to draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable
constitutional privileges for purposes of allowing narrowing statu-

7 The Harvard Note finds the Court's defamation and obscenity privilege rules
"sufficient" but not the rules with respect to sedition. Compare 83 HARV. L. REV. at 883-90
with id. at 897-907.
7r TRIBE, note 7 supra, at 714-16.
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tory constructions are fundamentally flawed. The defect inheres in
the impossibility of drawing principled distinctions, for these purposes, among the various rules of First Amendment privilege. The
entire effort posits a sharp contrast between two types of privilege
rules: (a) privilege rules which are subject-matter specific and which
"elevate a few factors to per se status," 7 7-for example, the actual
malice rule of the defamation cases and the obscenity criteria; 7 8 and
(b) other First Amendment privilege standards which assertedly
focus in an ad hoc manner on a combination of a much larger set of
variables, some outside the actor's control-for example, the
"fighting words" and Brandenburg7 9 incitement standards which,
inter alia, focus "on the propensity of defined conduct to bring
about concrete harms.
... 80 This distinction between the two
types of privileges seems to me to rest, in part, on a distortion of the
substantive content of the "acceptable" privileges, 81 and, in part, on
a thinly disguised rejection of the constitutional adequacy of the
82
disfavored privileges.
Most important, however, the asserted distinction between the
two types of privilege rules cannot bear the weight placed on it.
Admitting that certain kinds of harm justify some content-bdsed
regulation, the categorization approach seeks to identify those
harms "at wholesale in advance, outside the context of specific
77 Harvard Note at 884.
78 "It is important to notice the analytical focus of the Sullivan and Roth-Memoirs tests. The
former does not aim at the amount of tangible harm wrought by defamatory statements, but
at the culpability of the speaker in abstraction from consequences. Rotb-Memoirs aims not
only at any harm to social interests which obscene materials might induce but also at the
supposed worthlessness-hence unprotectedness-of such materials." Id. at 886-87.
7' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("... the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
80 Harvard Note at 887.
"I The characterization of obscenity, note 78 supra, seems to assume that obscenity is
limited to hard-core pornography which is self-demonstratingly worthless material of the
"I-know-it-when-I-see-it" variety. Perhaps that was accurate prior to Miller v. California,
note 7 supra. But now more attention must be paid to such elusive matters as community
standards. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
The defamation privilege cannot be reduced to a state-of-the-mind question. The issue of
truth is centrally important, both in and of itself, but also as bearing on the actor's state of
mind. Moreover, inquiry into the actor's state of mind may itself involve a relatively broadranged, fact-dependent inquiry. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
s E.g., Harvard Note at 905-06.
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cases." 3 This avoids the danger of distortion brought about by the
pull of specific facts and particular litigants. But the categories
having been established, ex ante, the problem of application occurs.
At that stage, no privilege rule is or can be completely independent
of the underlying factual circumstances to which it is applied, nor is
there any reason to suppose that any adjudication under one set of
privilege rules is materially more immune from the risk of speechpunishing mistake than under other privilege rules.8 4 The system
of privilege rules, real or imagined, varies only in degree of adjudicative predictability. No subset of these rules can be identified,
ex ante, for purposes of distinguishing in a principled way between
those privilege rules which can tolerably be utilized for statute
narrowing and those which cannot. Once state court power to
apply separability doctrine to statutes which touch expression is
acknowledged in any form, no coherent limitation on that power
can be developed.
Recent authority is completely consistent with this analysis. Arnett and its progeny represent a decisive rejection of any contention
that overbreadth is a special separability rule requiring that overbroad statutes can be given a saving construction only if it is possible to specify some "satisfactory" category of privileged conduct.
Indeed, apart from Thornhill itself, Supreme Court opinions provide little support for the commentators' view that the overbreadth
doctrine in any way limits the power of state courts to narrow
statutes to constitutionally specified boundaries in the application
process.8 5 In reviewing any case involving free expression the
Court invariably accepts the gloss the highest state court has placed
on a state statute . 8 6 To be sure, the statute, however narrowed in
83 ELY, note lOsupra, at 110.
14 Professor Ely seems to assume that all privilege rules are relatively free of inquiry into
audience reaction. Id. at 110. I think that assertion implausible (Compare Ely's treatment of
Brandenburg in the text at 115 with id. 232-33 n.24.) See Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 302 (1981): "... . 'incitement', for
example, still involves an individualized assessment." But even if Ely is right, commentators
like Tribe who seek to distinguish among privilege rules are wrong.
Is The first important decision after Thornhill accepted the state court narrowing construction. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-78 (1941). For the argument that the
narrowing came too late, see Monaghan, note 61 supra, at 539-43.
86 See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773-76 (1977) (state court construes obscenity
statute in accordance with the specificity requirements of Miller v. California, note 7 supra);
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1972) (disorderly conduct statute); Shuttles-
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the state system, may still be constitutionally infirm; 87 but any such
defect is the product of substantive First Amendment principles
rather than a special nonseparability restriction imposed on the
state courts by the First Amendment.
Contrary to the view of Professor Tribe, Gooding v. Wilson 8 is
fully consistent with these principles. Georgia had convicted the
defendant under a statute forbidding any person "without provocation, to use to or of another, and in his presence ... opprobrious
words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace."
While defendant's speech arguably constituted unprotected
"fighting words," 8 9 the Supreme Court focused entirely on the
terms of the rule applied: 9 0
[The statute] punishes only spoken words. It can therefore withstand appellee's attack upon its facial constitutionality only if, as
authoritatively construed by the Georgia courts, it is not susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that
is protected by the First and Fourth Amendments.... Only the
Georgia courts can supply the requisite construction, since of
course, "we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state
legislation." It matters not that the words appellee used might
have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1965) (prospective narrowing
valid).
Even if the Supreme Court could insist on making its own independent determination of
the content of the state law, as in Indiana ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100
(1938), it is still state law that is being interpreted, and thus the Court must cut the state
statute down to size if it concludes that was what the state law required. See Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, note 17 supra, at 2899, n.26.
87 Winters v. New York, note 22 supra, 519-20. (State court interpretation fixes the
meaning of the statute in this case, but even so constrained the statute is unconstitutionally
vague.)
88 Note 63 supra at 518.
89 Justice Blackmun wrote in dissent (p. 534):
It seems strange, indeed, that in this day a man may say to a police officer, who is
attempting to restore access to a public building, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you"
and "you son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death," and say to an accompanying
officer, "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all
to pieces," and yet constitutionally cannot be prosecuted and convicted under [the]
state statute. ...
The unprotected character of this speech seems very arguable even on the general premise
that a policeman is under a duty to exercise greater restraint than the general members of the
public in reacting to provocative language. Cf. Gunther, ". . . The Case ofJustice Powell," 24
STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972), with the Court's subsequent decision in Lewis v. New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130 (1974).
90 Note 63 supra at 520. On my analysis nothing of importance turns on the fact that the
statute "punishes only spoken words."
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The Court then concluded that, even as narrowed by the state
courts, the statute still reached more than unprotected fighting
words and hence was facially defective.
Professor Tribe seems in error in reading Gooding and other
"offensive-speech" decisions as limiting the power of the state court
to reconstruct statutes so as to reach only unprotected fighting
words. 9 1 The Gooding Court simply emphasized the impermissibly
expansive scope of the rule actually employed by the state court.
Had the Georgia courts tailored the statute to a constitutionally
acceptable size-that is, to fit only "fighting words"-the Supreme
Court would have been compelled to face one of two very different
and much thornier questions: whether defendant's speech was in
fact constitutionally protected92 or whether the fighting
words cat93
egory should be either abandoned or restructured.
Finally, it might be argued that overbreadth's inseparability
analysis is at least justified where no privilege rule exists to constrain
the statute. The suggestion will not work. I think that analysis will
show that in these situations the controlling substantive law is
necessarily compelling state interest or some other balancing test.
In these circumstances, overbreadth inquiry is essentially the
94
means-focused, least restrictive alternative inquiry.
IV. THE CONTOURS OF OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
A. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS

The Court, apparently confused about the nature of the overbreadth doctrine, has formulated various limiting devices. Opportunity to press overbreadth challenges has been denied to litigants
falling within the "hard core" of a statute's valid sweep, 9 5 to liti91 TRIBE, note 7supra, at § 12-26, pp. 715-16.
92 The relevant cases on state power to control "offensive" speech are collected in
GUNTIER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS note 8 supra, at 1229-43. See
also White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Gormley v. Director, Connecticut
State Dep't of Adult Probation, 101 S. Ct. 591 (1980) (annoying telephone call).
9' Schauer, note 88supra, at 269 n. 19 (1981); Gard, FightingWordsas FreeSpeech, 58 WASH.
U. L. Q. 531 (1980).

" Sometimes, however, the relevant substantive inquiry will generate elaboration of a
different set of categories, e.g., whether the speech took place in a "public forum."
9' See, Haig v. Agee, note 5 supra, at 2783 n.61, citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733,755-56 (1974). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, note 22supra, at 479, 491-92; Brown v.
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gants contesting regulations of commercial speech, 96 and to litigants challenging conduct-focused statutes unlikely to generate an
97
appreciable range of invalid applications to expressive conduct.
These "exceptions" are evidence of the doctrinal disorder surrounding overbreadth analysis. Quite plainly, the "exceptions" do
not contradict the point that overbreadth doctrine does not restrict
judicial power to truncate statutes to constitutionally prescribed
boundaries. Nor, conversely, do they somehow license courts to
apply substantively invalid rules because of the nature of the regulatory rule or of the litigant's conduct. Consider, for example, the
suggestion that a litigant who falls within the "hard core" of a
statute cannot complain of overbreadth as to others. The meaning
of this statement is hardly plain as overbreadth theory now stands.
To be sure, such a litigant is unlikely to be able to object on vagueness grounds to a narrowing construction. And the decision to
constrain the statute by an applicable rule of privilege is a decision
that the statute is separable, so that any unconstitutional applications are to be excised in the application process. But the litigant is
still entitled to the application of a valid rule of law, his "hard-core"
status notwithstanding.
Overbreadth simply expresses that requirement of a substantively valid rule in the context of First Amendment substantive law.
That expression is, however, affected by the tension within substantive First Amendment doctrine between categorization and
balancing as distinct approaches to the validity of content-based
restrictions. Where the categorization approach is relevant, the
statute may not reach beyond the relevant unprotected category. 9s
By contrast, in cases in which the compelling state interest or other
balancing test is triggered, the Court must address the weight of the
governmental interest and matters of regulatory precision.9 9 In
cases in which a balancing approach is operative, the probability of
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 147-48 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see Gooding v.
Wilson, note 63 supra.
96 Batesv. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977); Village of Schaumburg, note4
supra, at 634. Cf. Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, note 55
supra.
97 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, note 2 supra, at 615-16.

98 E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130(1974) ("opprobrious language"); Communist
Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) (oath).
99 E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York,
note 55 supra. See also note I1 supra.
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a saving construction is, perhaps, less than where the categorization
approach obtains because the state court may not be in an appropriate institutional position to truncate a statute to satisfy the least
restrictive alternative analysis.
Whether the categorization or the balancing approach is appropriate, the important point is that the litigant is entitled to the
application of a constitutionally valid rule. Schadv. Borough of Mount
Ephrahn'0 0 is recent confirmation of that point. In Schad, the wares
of an adult bookstore included a coin-operated mechanism permitting the customer to watch a live nude dancer performing behind a
glass panel, and the store's owner was charged with violating a
zoning ordinance prohibiting any live entertainment in a commercial zone. Some forms of nude dancing may fall with the protection
of the First Amendment, 10 ' although my inclinations are with the
dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice on this predominantly prurient variety. But I think the Chief Justice is wrong in putting the
decisive question in these terms: 102
As applied, [the ordinance] operates as a ban on nude dancing in
appellants' "adult" book store, and for that reason alone it is
here. Thus, the issue in the case that we have before us is not
whether Mount Ephraim may ban traditional live entertainment,
but whether it may ban nude dancing, which is used as the
"bait" to induce customers into the appellants' book store.
When, and if, this ordinance is used to prevent a high school
performance of "The Sound of Music," for example, the Court
can deal with that problem.
Contrary to the Chief Justice's view, the defendant-whatever he
did-is, as the Court recognized, entitled to a judicial evaluation of
the facial constitutionality of a blanket ban against live entertainment in a commercial zone. That prohibition may or may not be
valid, but the issue cannot be reduced, as the ChiefJustice thought,
to a question of the protected character of defendant's expres03

sion.1

100 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
101 Indeed, I so argued as counsel in the Hair case, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v.
Conrad, note 1 supra, at 546 (1975).
M02
Note 100 supra, at 2191-92 (italics in original).
103 The court framed the issue in these terms (id. at 2181):
As the Mount Ephraim code has been construed by the New Jersey courts-a
construction that is binding upon us-"live entertainment," including nude dancing, is "not permitted use in any establishment" in the Borough of Mount Ephraim.
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Nor can the Supreme Court decline to entertain a facial challenge
by itself supplying a saving construction to an otherwise impermissible state statute. The contrary suggestion of cases like Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville1 4 is unsound. Erznoznik correctly sustained a
facial attack to a content-based ordinance which the state court had
10 5
failed to narrow to the appropriate constitutional boundary line.
In so doing, however, the Court added that "the possibility of a
limiting construction appears remote."'10 6 This concern is appropriate in the setting of a suit in the federal courts seeking to restrain
enforcement of a state statute on grounds of facial invalidity. 107 But
it is wholly misplaced in Erznoznik. That case had arisen in the state
courts and the ordinance had been given an authoritative construction by the state courts-thus excluding the possibility of a "Yazoo
presumption." Facial scrutiny by the Supreme Court in such cases
does not extend beyond a consideration of whether the state rule, as
authoritatively construed by the state courts, satisfies relevant con10 8
stitutional standards.
By excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, the Mount Ephraim
ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within
the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Entertainment, as well as
political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast
by radio and television and live entertainment such as musical and dramatic works,
fall within the First Amendment guarantee. [Citations omitted.] Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude human
figure.
Whatever First Amendment protection should be extended to nude dancing, live
or on film, however, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits all live entertainment
in the Borough: no property in the Borough may be principally used for the
commercial production of plays, concerts, musicals, dance or any other form of live
entertainment. Because appellants' claims are rooted in the First Amendment, they
are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of
others as well as their own.
See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 422 U.S. 922, 933 (1974) upholding a grant of a preliminary injunction in a challenge by bar owners to an ordinance that prohibited females from
appearing topless not just in bars but "in any public place." Compare New York State Liquor
Authority v. Bellanca, 101 S. Ct. 2599, 2601 (1981)(upholding prohibition of topless dancing
in a barroom).
104 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
a05
Id. at 216, The ordinanceprohibited exhibition of any "motion picture ... in which
the human male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic
areas are shown if such motion picture ...is visible from any public street or public place."
Id. at 206-07.
06
1 Id. at 216.
107 E.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611,615-16 (1968); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S.
676 (1972).
108 HART & WECHSLER'S 1981 Supplement at 87-88. See also, e.g., Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1960).
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OVERBREADTH AND NON-CONTENT-BASED STATE STATUTES

If facial challenges are permissible with respect to any rule impinging on constitutionally protected speech, what facial review
methodology is appropriate for ordinary criminal statutes, such as
prohibitions against trespass and theft? While generally regulating
"nonspeech," these statutes will on occasion be applied to "speech,"
a term which, substantively, embraces a diverse range of activities
with many different qualities: solicitation and contribution of
money, picketing, mass demonstrations, expressive conduct,
etc. 10 9 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 1 0 the Court, in the course of an
elaborate effort at restating the overbreadth standing doctrine,'"
sought to confine facial condemnation of statutes of this sort.
Positing a general distinction between "pure speech" and conduct,
including "expressive conduct," the Court said that overbreadth
12
concerns attenuate
as the otherwise protected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive- falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws. . . . To put the matter another way,
particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved,
we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.
The analytic framework suggested in Broadrick contained considerable ambiguity and uncertainty, including, inter alia, whether the
focus of the Court's distinction between "pure speech" and conduct
13
relates to the terms of the statute or to the litigant's activity;
whether the "exceptions" recognized by the Court to its general
distinction are potentially engulfing;" 4 and, finally, whether a dis109E.g., Village of Schaumburg, note 4 supra (solicitations); Buckley v. Valeo, note 55
supra (contributions); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (mass demonstration); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (expressive conduct).
110 Note 2 supra, at 601.

II'1d. at 609-16.
112 Id. at 615.
113 Professor Tribe apparently reads the Court's language as focusing on the statute.
TRIBE, note 7 supra, at § 12-25, p. 713, referring to the Court's "troublesome distinction

between 'pure speech' regulations and 'conduct' regulations." For a heroic effort to explicate
the decision, see Note, Overbreadtb Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532,
538-43 (1974).
114 Note 2 supra, at 612-13:

Such claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving stat-
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tinction between "pure speech" and conduct has any useful content. 115 However these questions are resolved, the core point
remains-the Court will be hostile to facial condemnation of statutes whose central focus is prohibition of tangible harms unrelated
to the content of the expression generated by the production of
those harms. This hostility, moreover, is not mitigated merely because such statutes can be applied to a rather disparate variety of
constitutionally protected expression.'"
Although the Court's general conclusion is sound, its underpinnings are, I think, quite different from those advanced by the
Court. The question is not whether a defendant can raise an overbreadth challenge to an "ordinary" criminal statute; the facial validity of the rule actually invoked is always theoretically open to
challenge. General criminal statutes, however, are potentially applicable in a wide variety of settings which, in turn, implicate a
correspondingly wide range of First Amendment principles. No
single determinative First Amendment privilege rule exists for the
purpose of statutory narrowing; nor is the compelling state interest
test a meaningful litmus test against which to evaluate the statute.
Consider, for example, the wide range of applications of an ordinary trespass statute in the context of expression: leafletting in a
company town, interruption of a judicial proceeding to make a
protest, demonstrating in the curtilage of a jail, etc. Plainly, the
statute cannot be evaluated, ex ante, in a vacuum, as it sits on the
statute books. Nor should it. "The pinch of the statute is in its
utes which, by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words.' Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).... Overbreadth attacks have also been allowed
where the Court thought rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by
their broad sweep, might result in burdening innocent associations. . . . Facial
overbreadth claims have also been entertained where statutes, by their terms,
purport to regulate the time, place, and manner of expressive or communicative
conduct .... and where such conduct has required official approval under laws that
delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights....
115 See Kalven, The Concept of the PublicForum: Coxv. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. C1'. REV. 1.See
also Henkin, Foreword: On DrawingLines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 79-80 (1968): "The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between speech and conduct, but between conduct
that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of conduct. If it is intended as expression, if in
fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a common comprehensible form of expression,
it is 'speech."' See also Ely, note 53 supra, at 1495.
116"Equally important, overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."
Note 2 supra, at 613.
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application."' 17 Thus the point at which to determine whether any
statute is facially defective is at the time and in the terms in which it is
applied to a litigant. But when a trespass statute is in fact applied to
anything embraced within the constitutional definition of speech,
the contextually specific construction given to the statute must be
valid. 1 18 If it is not, the statute is to that extent-and to that extent
only-invalid as a matter of constitutional law.
The requirement of an acceptable, contextually specific construction ordinarily will mean that the relevant constitutional principles
must be sufficiently elaborated by the state court to ensure that
the statute's reach is sufficiently constrained. 1 19 An elaboration requirement leaves little scope for application of the Yazoo separability "presumption"' 2 0 in the First Amendment context. If, for
example, the state court simply holds that its general trespass statute validly applies to the expression shown by the evidence, the
decision is vulnerable. In this context, the decisive question is
whether any plausible basis exists for a fear that the state court
failed to apply a permissible rule in sustaining the conviction. This
inquiry will require some inspection, however cursory, of the evidence, because the evidence will enable the reviewing court to
categorize the case properly among the potentially relevant First
Amendment contexts. In Coates v. City of Cincinnati,'2 . for example, the sparse record showed little more than that the defendants
had been involved in activities frequently, albeit not invariably,
constitutionally privileged: a student demonstration and labor dispute picketing. They had been convicted under an ordinance which
117 Terminiello v. Chicago, note 37 supra, and accompanying text.
118E.G., Cox v. Louisiana, note 109 supra. The cases cited by the Court in Broadrick,
note 2 supra, at 613-14, show this. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), for
example, involved a conviction for the common law crime of inciting a breach of the peace.
The Court noted that this offense "embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility." Id. at 308. Whether this definition suffices for a conviction
for throwing beer cans at windows, it is not sufficient in the area of freedom of speech.
119 In this context, elaboration will often be in a negative form, for example: "Defendant's
trespass conviction is affirmed because the first amendment does not include a right to
interrupt a judicial proceeding to make a protest."
If the court held, however, that "defendant's trespass conviction is affirmed because the
first amendment does not include a right to talk in any public place," the result would be
different. That rule of state law is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of free
speech.
120 See the text and notes at pp. 6-8 supra.
121402 U.S. 611 (1971).
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made it unlawful "for three or more persons to assemble,
any of the sidewalks, street corners

. . .

. .

. on

and there conduct them-

selves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. ...
It may
be, as the dissent argued, that this is like an "ordinary criminal
statute"'123 and that, as the Court recognized, it "is broad enough to
encompass many types of conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. ' 124 Nevertheless, the Court correctly
sustained a facial attack for overbreadth (and vagueness). The
judgment of the state court amounted to little more than a conclusion that the ordinance applied, and validly so, to defendants' conduct. 125 Once it appeared from the record that defendants' conduct
arguably fell within a category of First Amendment concern, the
judgment was properly reversed, since the Court could not safely
conclude that a constitutionally sufficient rule has been applied by
the state court. And, as a matter of substantive First Amendment
26
law, the state bears the duty to make precisely that showing.'
C. OVERBREADTH AND FEDERAL STATUTES

In situations in which a federal statute or regulation touching
expression can be authoritatively construed to accord with an applicable rule of constitutional privilege, the function of overbreadth
standing is significantly limited.1 27 To be sure, institutional constraints exist on the Court's authority to restructure federal statutes;
at some point, such judicial efforts will exceed the bounds of what
legitimately can pass as statutory "construction."'' 28 But the case
law makes plain that this limitation, rooted in the separation-ofpowers concepts, is not a significant inhibition.12 9 The Court
122

1d. at611 n.1.
123 Id. at 620 (White, J., dissenting).
124Id. at 614.
125Id. at 613-14.
126 E.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); see also Cooper v. Mitchell
Bros.' Santa Ana Theatre, 102 S. Ct. - (1981). Justice White's dissent in Coates overlooks
this point when in the penultimate sentence of the dissent he argues that the ordinance is not
invalid on its face and the deficiencies in the record leave the Court "in no position" to judge
the ordinance as applied. 402 U.S. at 620-21.
127 HART & WECHSLER at 212.

12 "It is true ... that it is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite the statute." United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). See generally TRIBE, note 7
supra, at § 12-27.
129United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, note 128 supra, provides a particularly
apt illustration that this limitation does not impose serious constraints. The Court there
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now seems thoroughly committed to truncating federal statutes in
light of the applicable rules of constitutional privilege. 130 Thus,
overbreadth holdings of facial invalidity should disappear in cases
challenging federal authority, save for those instances involving
unreconstructible statutes, rules, or orders' 31 or where the Court is
plainly condemning the statute on the merits because of its failure
to satisfy the least restrictive alternative requirement.
Argument can be mounted that overbreadth methodology should
have a larger, rather than a smaller, role in review of federal enactments. So long as fair-warning requirements have been satisfied,
the Court cannot oversee the interpretive ingenuity of state courts
in their efforts to confine state statutes to the area of constitutionally
unprotected activity. 132 But the Court labors under no similar disability with respect to federal statutes, and the deterrence rationale
underlying the overbreadth doctrine might therefore dictate a special canon of federal statutory construction counseling against judicial narrowing. Such a canon might be justified on either institutional or substantive grounds. The institutional argument would
contend that the Court has a unique responsibility to educate the
other federal branches in the need for sensitivity to free-speech
interests. A holding of invalidity for overbreadth would, in effect,
"remand" the problem to the relevant branch for more finely tuned
attention to speech concerns and a judgment about whether the
governmental interest being pursued demanded regulation of
speech to the constitutional limit, a place beneath that limit, or not
at all. Forcing attention to these matters by the nonjudicial
branches, moreover, might generate sensitivity to speech interests
in a more generalized and systematic way, reducing thereby the
upheld a federal statute prohibiting importation of obscene materials and providing for their
seizure. In so doing, the four-member plurality rejected on the merits an objection that the
statutory standard was substantively overbroad but went on to note that in any event "the
proper approach . . . was not to invalidate the section in its entirety, but to construe it
narrowly ..
" Id. at 375 n.3. And a majority of the Court then proceeded to read in
constitutionally required procedural safeguards. Id. at 368-75 (plurality opinion); id. at 377,
378 (concurring opinions).
ao See the text and notes at p. 18 supra.
131 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) might be rationalized on this
ground. The principal kind of statute that probably cannot be rehabilitated in the application
process is a scheme that was administered in an open-ended, unbridled fashion.
Shuttleworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). See Monaghan, note 61 supra, at
518, 539-43.
132 United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, note 128 supra, at 369-70.
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need for future judicial interventions. The substantive justification
for such a canon of federal statutory construction is that discussed
in Section II above, that is, that certain privilege rules provide
inadequate guidance to enforcement officials and speakers1 33 and
hence should not be judicially "penciled in" to save federal statutes
from holdings of unconstitutionality.
The substantive argument is no more potent here than it was in
relation to the constitutional limits on separability of state statutes.
If a privilege rule is constitutionally adequate to guide a legislature
in drafting a statute, it is equally adequate to guide a court in
creating a saving construction. Only on the assumption that the
privilege rules running against the federal government should be
different from those against the states could the substantive case be
made for special limitations on the power of federal courts to rescue
federal statutes by construction. Any such assumption seems to me
implausible, and, not surprisingly, it has never been one embraced
by the Court.
The institutional argument is somewhat more difficult to meet
but is vulnerable, on inspection, to powerful institutional counterarguments. Although increasing sensitivity to speech interests
across the federal branches is no doubt a constitutional "good,"
fostering that goal by way of a judicial refusal to save overbroad
federal statutes generates serious countervailing costs. First, invalidation of a federal statute would leave some unprotected and presumably harmful speech or conduct wholly unregulated while
13 4
Congress or the executive struggles to formulate a valid rule.
Given the heavy agenda of government, the matter might remain
without attention for a substantial time period, a particularly serious matter with respect to matters subject to exclusive federal authority. Second, "remands" to other branches for a more speech133 E.g., TRIBE, note 7 supra, at § 12-26, p. 715 (advocating overbreadth approach "where
the validity of the first amendment privilege must be decided in terms of the factual circumstances in which the claim is raised ..
" Professor Tribe, it should be noted, does not
distinguish here between federal and state statutes in this respect.
':a State statutes held defective on overbreadth grounds can be rehabilitated by the state
courts prospectively. E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, note 22 supra, at 491; Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, note 86 supra, at 153-55; Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who
and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363, 1387 (1973). By contrast, if a federal statute is found
facially defective it "is void in toto, barring all further actions under it, in this, and every other
case." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). Perhaps this point has more theoretical
than practical significance-given the fact that someone will have to invoke the state court's
jurisdiction and questions of issue preclusion will arise. See Shapiro, note 30 supra.

1]
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sensitive response may produce little future speech sensitivity. The
nonjudicial branches respond to various political pressures, and
little evidence exists that judicial refusals to tolerate repression are
likely to produce substantially more refined political responses to
the need to accommodate speech when future censorial urges develop. To the extent that this is true, it is not evident that the
present hiatus costs in the exercise of federal power are justified by
any countervailing gain in future speech sensitivity within the
political branches of the federal government.
Finally, both the substantive and institutional arguments for a
special canon of federal statutory construction leave me with the
suspicion of a "double counting" of speech values. The premise of
the Court's obscenity holdings, for example, is that the boundary
separating obscene and nonobscene material is sufficient so as not to
deter protected speech at an unacceptable level. It is hard to see
why this premise should be completely abandoned at the level of
statutory construction. Invocation of inseparability principles as a
canon of federal statutory construction is, therefore, tantamount to
a direct attack on the adequacy of what has been adjudicated to be a
35
constitutionally sufficient dividing line. 1
V. BROADRICK V. OKLAHOMA: THE COMPLEXITIES OF
OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS

Broadrick v. Oklahoma'3 6 is a graphic illustration of the
difficulties inherent in thinking about overbreadth as a special inseparability doctrine. Broadrick involved a statute specifically directed at activity within the general ambit of the First
Amendment-partisan political activity by state civil service employees.' 3 7 The Court assumed that the statutory provisions,
though generally valid, 13 8 embraced some constitutionally protected acts, such as wearing campaign buttons and displaying
bumper stickers.' 3 9 On the premise that the overbreadth of statutes
135 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175-77 (1979) (constitutionally prescribed limits on
defamation suits do not justify an additional evidentiary privilege for press).
M6 Note 2 supra.
137 The statute is set out in note I of the Court's opinion, id. at 603-04.
las A companion case, United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of
Letter Carriers, note 72 supra, had sustained similar federal legislation.
1a9 413 U.S. at 609-10.
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regulating expressive conduct "must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep,"' 40 the Court upheld the statute against facial attack.
Broadrick's holding, albeit not all of its language, squares with a
view that the overbreadth doctrine does not restrict judicial authority to narrow statutes to appropriate constitutional boundary lines.
Broadrick arose in the district court as a suit to enjoin proceedings
before a state administrative agency charging the plaintiffs with
various violations of the state statute. The charges did not include
wearing buttons or displaying bumper stickers. In fact, no state
court had authoritatively concluded that the Oklahoma statute
reached those acts. 4 ' Ignoring the obvious abstention possibilities, 142 the Court focused on the facial challenge. Even if,
however, the Court correctly assumed that the act reached this
protected expression, plaintiff's suit should fail. The act was not
being enforced in these respects against the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
could only prevail on a demonstration that the invalid applications
could not be severed from the valid ones-an issue, I have argued,
controlled by state law. The state supreme court could not rationally be expected to invalidate the entire act on inseparability
grounds simply because of a few marginal invalid applications.
Thus the Court was right in not permitting the offending aspects of
the statutory scheme to condemn the statute in its entirety.
Broadrick is particularly instructive in illustrating the need to
think clearly about the meaning of overbreadth analysis. The conventional setting for overbreadth theorists usually involves a test of
the facial sufficiency of a "single" prohibition-for example, a statute prohibiting "offensive or indecent language"-judicially evaluated by viewing it in terms of some obvious, standard instances of
its application. Broadrick demonstrates the unusual difficulty of
comprehending the focus of a "facial" attack when its subject is a
140 Id. at 615. For the argument that the decision is incorrect, even on its own terms, see
Note, note 113 supra, at 542: ". . . the wearing of buttons and bumper stickers would
"
appear to merit the same consideration as pure speech ..
In effect, the Court "treated the state's regulation of political activity the way an ordinary
trespass or theft statute might be treated." TRIBE, note 7 supra, at § 12-25, p. 713.
141 The state administrative agency charged with enforcement of the act had so held. 413
U.S. at 610 n. 10. Compare Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154, 162-63, 165 (1971) (agency construction "entitled to respectful consideration").
142 The state act expressly exempted from its reach the employee's right to vote and his
right to express privately his political beliefs (expansively defined). 413 U.S. at 617-18.
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complex, interrelated statutory scheme (or administrative regulation or order) that impinges on a wide range of expressive behavior.
It illustrates, too, the particular difficulties of such a challenge in
the context of a suit for anticipatory relief in the federal district
courts. There is need for adequate integration of overbreadth doctrine with the constitutional and prudential doctrines, particularly
ripeness and abstention, which govern the timing and scale of constitutional challenges. Surely conventional doctrines governing access to the federal courts have a function in the free-speech context,
as elsewhere. Abstention doctrine has a legitimate role to play in
defining the contours of the statute. 14 3 Moreover, the lack of a
concrete threat of enforcement of various discrete provisions of a
broad, complex act gives rise to concerns as to whether a challenge
1 44
to them is ripe either constitutionally or prudentially.
If overbreadth is viewed as a special First Amendment standing doctrine-or, to be more precise, a special inseparability
doctrine-it renders unintelligible much of the theorizing underlying the constitutional and prudential restrictions on federal "judicial power." If, by contrast, overbreadth is simply understood as a
disposition on the merits, it can be fitted into these conventional
notions. Thus, for example, a court might decline to pass on the
overbreadth challenge in a declaratory judgment action brought by
a litigant whose clearly unprotected expression falls within the hard
core of a statute readily constrained by an applicable rule of
privilege. 145 This is true even though the same litigant could insist
on his overbreadth challenge being decided if he were a defendant
in an enforcement proceeding. In the declaratory judgment action,
the litigant would, in substance, be asking whether the courts will,
as a matter of statutory construction, refuse to narrow the statute to
constitutional boundaries, thereby rendering the statute invalid. If
the litigant's expression is clearly unprotected and within the hard
143See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'! Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308-12 (1979).
Not surprisingly, the ascendancy of overbreadth methodology was accompanied by a corresponding decline of abstention doctrine. Harvard Note at 901-07.
144See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, note 43 supra, at 298-305; Socialist
Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-88 (1972). See generally HART & WECHSLER at
133-49; 1981 Supplement at 45-52; Shapiro, note 30supra.
145 Consider, e.g., a suit by the publisher of a book clearly constituting hard-core pornography challenging a state obscenity statute on the ground that it is invalid for failure to
comply with the specificity requirements of Miller v. California, note 7 supra, a defect
which can be cured by judicial construction. Ward v. Illinois, note 86 supra.
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core of the statute, it is at least arguable that "Our Federalism"
might warrant a denial of such an advance determination without
146
any consideration of "Pullman abstention" possibilities.
Most important, Broadrick illustrates that simply because one or
several provisions of a complex act or regulation are involved in
litigation, that cannot mean that every potential subsection of the
act or regulation is thereby implicated on some constitutionally
based inseparability premise. Any such result would wreak havoc
with complex regulatory schemes, some small part of which might
be constitutionally infirm. More generally, I submit that overbreadth simply cannot be sensibly understood to denote a special
rule against restructuring complex regulatory provisions to accord
with applicable constitutional rules of privilege. Metromedia, Inc. 'U.
City ofSan Diego147 is a recent illustration of this point. At issue was
the validity of a complex, partially content-based ordinance that
imposed substantial prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising displays within the city. The state supreme court had sustained the entire ordinance against a facial attack. A divided Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The prevailing
four-man plurality opinion remanded the case to the state court to
determine whether, as a matter of state law, the entire ordinance
was now void on inseparability grounds or was to be applied in
accord with the limiting constitutional restrictions.' 4 8 No suggestion was advanced in any of the opinions that the ordinance was
void in toto as a matter of federal constitutional law simply because
part of its prohibitions were invalid.
VI. CONCLUSION

Advocates of a special overbreadth "standing" rule in freespeech cases have developed an elaborate theory, one that purports
146 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See Shapiro, note 30
supra, at 768-70. Chapters 7 of HART & WECHSLER and its 1981 Supplement collect the
relevant materials on the range of issues open to a prospective state defendant who initiates a
federal court suit for anticipatory relief. My own general bias is to permit a prospective
defendant to raise by way of anticipatory challenge an issue properly open to him in an
enforcement proceeding. See Note, DeclaratoryRelief in the CriminalLaw, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1490 (1967). Moreover, in the First Amendment context, there may be some constitutional
requirement of anticipatory relief. See Monaghan, note 61 supra, at 543-5 1. But I hope that I
am not insensitive to appropriate federalism barriers to federal anticipatory relief.
Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," 43 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 39, 43-49 (1980).
147 101 S. Ct. at 2882.

148 Id. at 2899 n.26.
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to be grounded in special First Amendment concerns. Its premises
are that overbroad statutes deter protected speech at an unacceptable rate, and that the conventional judicial technique of excising
14 9
unconstitutional applications is insufficient to cure that defect.
These premises have become the subject of increasing skepticism,
both off and on the Court. 150 Recent Supreme Court decisions
seem to provide little support for viewing overbreadth as a special,
speech-protective standing doctrine. Rather, viewed in standing
terms, overbreadth methodology simply applies the conventional
principle that any litigant may insist on not being burdened by a
constitutionally invalid rule. What is different from the conventional run-of-the-mill case is not standing but the substantive content of the applicable constitutional law.
As an expression of substantive constitutional principles, overbreadth is, of course, concerned with the weight of the governmental interest justifying any regulation.' 5 ' But the dominant idea
it evokes is serious means scrutiny. Wherever that law mandates
strict or intermediate scrutiny, a requirement of regulatory precision is involved; a substantial congruence must exist between the
regulatory means (the statute, as construed) and valid legislative
ends.' 52 Thus the Court has reacted interchangeably to "over53
breadth" and "least restrictive alternative" challenges both inside1
and outside' 5 4 the First Amendment context. This observation
would be particularly unsurprising to writers who have focused on
the long and varying use of least restrictive alternative analysis in
Supreme Court adjudication; without exception, their surveys include a discussion of First Amendment overbreadth cases.' 55 This
149 The major theoretical piece is the elaborate Harvard Note, note 6supra. The main lines
of that analysis appear in summary form in TRIBE, note 7 supra, at §§ 12-24 to 12-28.
150Professor Cox asserts that the deterrence rationale rests on pretense. Cox, THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976). On the increasing judicial

skepticism toward the doctrine, see TRIBE, note 7supra, at § 12-25; GUNTHER, note 8supra,
1189-95 (1980).
151See note 11 supra.
152 The issue generally is framed in terms of the availability of less restrictive alternatives;
whenever the necessary congruence is lacking, the statute isoverbroad. In the First Amendment area we speak of overbreadth, but fashions in the use of language cannot disguise the
substantive identity of the two inquiries, as the Court occasionally explicitly recognizes.
Cameron v. Johnson, note 107 supra, at 616-17.
153 E.g., Cameron v. Johnson, note 107 supra.
154 E.g., Jones v. Helms, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2442-43 (1981). South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966).
155 E.g., Wormuth & Mirkin, note 64 supra, at 270-86, characterizing "the excessive
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is as it should be; 15 6 wherever the Supreme Court is serious about
judicial review-wherever, that is, the minimum rationality
standard does not prevail-the Court will be concerned with the
matter of least restrictive alternatives, with overbreadth. 157 By
contrast, whenever the rational basis standard governs, substantive
constitutional scrutiny is virtually nonexistent. Despite occasional
judicial and academic protestations to the contrary,' 5 8 that review
is essentially "toothless." In all cases subject to that standard,
statutory "overbreadth" is not a meaningful objection as a matter of
substantive constitutional doctrine. A central feature of rational
basis review is that it accords wide latitude to the states to structure
their social and economic programs as they see fit. As long as the
legislative scheme can be perceived as designed to promote some
common good, the overbreadth of the statutory scheme does not
render it constitutionally infirm. 159
breadth of the statute" as the equivalent of "the doctrine of the reasonable alternative." 1d. at
278. See also, Note, The Less Restrictive Alternativein ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, a
Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 1011-16 (1974), stating that "the
principle of less drastic means has found its most frequent application due primarily to the
popularity of the overbreadth technique. Id. at 1011. For the argument that overbreadth
analysis has its historical roots in the tightening of the clear-and-present danger test, see
Strong, Fity Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Scbenck to Brandenburg-andBeyond,
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 68-69.
156 But see Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York,
note 55 supra, at 565 n.8, attempting to distinguish between the two concepts. See also
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 4076 U.S. 168 (1972) (overbreadth challenges restricted to
First Amendment).
157 We ordinarily do not consider the least restrictive alternative cases as presenting any
departure from conventional standing principles. Nor should we when that same concept
appears in the First Amendment context. Judicial conclusions of overbreadth or of the
availability of less restrictive alternatives are equivalents. They are simply different statements that other, more finely tuned means exist to vindicate any presumably valid state
policies. Cameron v. Johnson, note 107 supra; Note, Less DrasticMeans and the FirstAmendment, 78 YALE L. J. 464, 470 (1969). Overbreadth analysis plays a different role when the
relevant First Amendment law focuses on whether the regulated speech is within an unprotected category. It is frequently clear, exante, that defendant's speech is unprotected. But this
is by no means invariably true. E.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
In either event, the litigant simply invokes the traditional right to insist on application of a
valid regulating rule. Here, too, overbreadth simply expresses the applicable substantive
First Amendment law, not a special First Amendment rule of standing.
158 See, for example, Bice, Rationality Analysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 M INN. L. Ri.*v. I
(1980); Bennett, Abortion and judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and
Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. L. REV. 978, 980-89 (1981).
159 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also, e.g., Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 441
U.S. 568 (1979); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 722-27 (1981);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1080-85 (1981). In the "old (lays" things may have
been different. Struve, note I1 supra, at 1479-80.
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Jones v. Helms 160 provides a recent illustration of these principles.
At issue was the validity of a Georgia statute that set harsher criminal penalties for parents who abandon children and leave the state
than for those abandoners who remain within it. After rejecting a
claim that the statute infringed on the defendant's constitutionally
protected right to travel, the Court addressed the equal protection
claim:

16 1

The characterization by the Court of Appeals and appellee of
the Georgia statute as "overbroad" does not affect our conclusion. Appellee contends, and the Court of Appeals found, that
Georgia has available less restrictive means to serve the legitimate purposes furthered by the felony [statute] .... However,

because we have concluded that [the statute] does not infringe
upon appellee's fundamental rights, this reasoning is inapplicable. In the context of this case, the State need not employ the
least restrictive, or even the most effective or wisest, means to
achieve its legitimate ends.
[..
IT]he statute may well be unnecessarily broad. This is a
matter, however, that relates to the wisdom of the legislation. It
raises no question with respect to the uniform and impartial
character of the State's law. It therefore does not implicate the
fundamental principle embodied in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In sum, overbreadth analysis is concerned with the substance of
constitutional review; it does not rely on any distinctive standing
component.
160101 S. Ct. at 2434.
161Id. at 2442-43.

